From Conditional Parsimony to Universal Generosity: Child-Contingent Cash Transfer Indicators for Poland (2005–2024)

Read the full article See related articles

Discuss this preprint

Start a discussion What are Sciety discussions?

Listed in

This article is not in any list yet, why not save it to one of your lists.
Log in to save this article

Abstract

Between 2005 and 2024, Poland underwent an unprecedented transformation of its system of monetary transfers to families with children on a European scale, moving from one of the least generous (spending < 1% of GDP) and selective systems to one of the most generous (2.5% of GDP) and universal systems. This paper analyzes the transformation from the perspective of compensating for the necessary costs of childcare, addressing three key questions: how the level of compensation evolved across income groups; how the progressivity of the system changed; and what role regulatory reforms played in this process. Using the EUROMOD microsimulation model and EU-SILC data for 2005–2024, we apply the Absolute Compensation Level (ACL) indicator for necessary childcare costs and introduce a new compensation progressivity index (ACP). The Bargain–Callan decomposition is used to separate the effects of policy changes from other factors. Our results identify three distinct policy regimes: (1) 2005–2006 – low generosity (ACL < 50%) and high progressivity; (2) 2007–2015 – low generosity (ACL < 55%) and moderate progressivity; and (3) 2016–2024 – very high generosity and low progressivity (ACL > 100% for all household decile groups in 2024). All major reforms (2007, 2016, 2019) coincided with parliamentary elections, and the decomposition confirms the dominant role of regulatory change in transforming the system. By 2024, 86% of all cash transfers originated from universal benefits, with a single instrument accounting for as much as 69% of total cash transfers.

Article activity feed