Enhancing GNSS Spoofing Detection by Carrier-Smoothing Pseudorange Double Difference Measurements

The presence of counterfeit GNSS signals (commonly referred to as spoofing), is an increasing threat to the integrity of modern navigation systems. These spoofing attacks can fool receivers into processing false signals, resulting in inaccurate position and time data. A simple yet effective method to detect spoofing is by using two separate receivers and computing the double difference (DD) of carrier phase measurements. The DD provides angle of arrival (AOA) information, which helps classify whether a satellite signal is genuine or spoofing. Building on this idea, we propose an improved dual-antenna GNSS spoofing detection technique. Instead of using carrier phase measurements to compute the DD, our approach relies on carrier-smoothed code pseudoranges. This eliminates the need to resolve integer ambiguities inherent in carrier phase-based DD calculations. Experimental results on a mixed tracking dataset consisting of authentic and spoofing satellites demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method.