<p class="MDPI12title" style="tab-stops: center 340.0pt right 520.0pt;">Research on the Decision-Making of Technological Transformation and Pollution Reduction and Carbon Emission Reduction of Energy Enterprises under the Reputation Incentive Mechanism
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This paper addresses the practical challenge of inadequate motivation for energy enterprises to reduce pollution and carbon emissions in the context of increasing environmental pollution and carbon emissions. From the perspective of the informal institution of reputation incentives, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving energy enterprises, the public and the government. Through theoretical derivation and numerical simulation, the paper systematically analyzes the influence path of reputational gains and losses on enterprises' technological transformation decisions, and examines the moderating effects of key parameters such as transformation costs and government subsidies. The conclusions are as follows: (1) The reputation incentive mechanism regulates the cost-profit structure of enterprises through the dual effects of reputation gains and losses, and has a significant driving effect on the technological transformation and pollution reduction and carbon emission reduction of energy enterprises. (2) The three-party strategy exhibits dynamic dependence and collaborative evolution characteristics. The system converges to the ideal equilibrium of enterprise transformation, public participation, and government empowerment, depending on the relative magnitudes and coupling relationships of key parameters such as transformation costs. (3) Government subsidies provide short-term incentives for enterprises to undergo transformation, but they also impose long-term constraints. Therefore, government subsidies need to be combined with the reputation incentive mechanism to achieve sustainable governance. These findings provide a theoretical foundation and practical reference for designing incentive-compatible policy combinations and promoting the deep low-carbon transformation of energy enterprises.