Blockbond Hardening: Securing Pooled-Hash Protocols Against Traffic Tampering, MITM Hash-Rate Hijacking, and Template Coercion

Read the full article See related articles

Discuss this preprint

Start a discussion What are Sciety discussions?

Listed in

This article is not in any list yet, why not save it to one of your lists.
Log in to save this article

Abstract

Pooled proof-of-work ecosystems inherit an expanding attack surface from plaintext or weakly authenticated transport, centralized job selection, and latency-sensitive job propagation, enabling adversaries to siphon hash power, manipulate workloads, or degrade availability at scale. This paper systematizes threats against mining coordination protocols, including man-in-the-middle share redirection, extranonce/job injection, and routing-layer disruption that silently wastes miner effort, then maps each vector to concrete transport- and protocol-layer countermeasures such as AEAD-secured sessions, authenticated key agreement, header-only job separation to curb emptyblock incentives, and decentralized template declaration to resist transaction-level coercion. A practitioner-focused implementation pathway demonstrates secure role composition with a pool service, translation proxy, template provider, and negotiator, hardening legacy endpoints while progressively enabling encrypted binary framing, version rolling controls, and minerdriven template workflows. The result is a defense-in-depth blueprint that both mitigates known Stratum-era attacks and reduces single points of failure in pooled mining, providing actionable guidance for secure-by-default deployment of nextgeneration coordination under adversarial network conditions.

Article activity feed