Corporate Governance in Brazil and Opportunistic Behavior in the Use of Insider Information
Discuss this preprint
Start a discussion What are Sciety discussions?Listed in
This article is not in any list yet, why not save it to one of your lists.Abstract
The opportunistic use of insider information generates adverse effects on capital markets, making its mitigation through robust corporate governance practices. This research analyzes the corporate governance mechanisms that reduce the signs of opportunistic insider trading, grounded in the assumptions of information asymmetry and opportunistic behavior. The hypotheses posit that firms listed on the Novo Mercado or Level 2 of Corporate Governance, with more independent boards of directors and greater female representation, active fiscal councils, consolidated ESG practices, non-family ownership structures, robust audit committees, and audits not conducted by Big Four firms, are less prone to opportunistic conduct. The sample comprises 237 firms, representing 51% of companies listed on [B]3 between 2010 and 2021, resulting in a total of 2175 firm-year observations. Panel data analysis supports the proposed hypotheses. The findings indicate that higher levels of corporate governance practices are associated with a lower incidence of opportunistic insider trading in the Brazilian capital market. This study contributes to the literature by highlighting the specific features of the largest stock market in Latin America and emphasizing the role of transparency, formal monitoring, and informal mechanisms, such as social and reputational pressure on insiders, in shaping ethical behavior and curbing the misuse of privileged information.