Plea for a Processual Perspectivism: Toward a Philosophy of Enactive Inference

This paper undertakes an ontological remapping of the philosophy of mind in light of the theory of enactive inference. We argue that David Chalmers' famous "Hard Problem" of consciousness is not an isolated puzzle awaiting resolution, but rather the symptom of a deeper, flawed premise: the stubborn persistence of a substance ontology and classical binary logic in our thinking. By drawing on the historical "Jacobi Dilemma," we demonstrate that any attempt to grasp consciousness as an isolated property inevitably leads into logical dead-ends. As an alternative, we develop a "Processual Perspectivism" (Leidig, 2025). By integrating current neurobiological findings on criticality (Tucker et al., 2025) and the thermodynamics of living systems (Non-Equilibrium Steady States, NESS), we demonstrate that consciousness is not an additional ingredient but must be understood as the intrinsic, affectively regulated control structure of autopoietic processes. It is not the puzzle, but the very solution to the problem of life itself.