Game-Theoretic Analysis of Supply Chain Restructuring from a Return–Risk Perspective

Based on the impact of the force majeure risks on the supply chain and from a return–risk perspective, this paper develops a game-theoretic framework to investigate supply chain restructuring. In the context of supply chain decoupling, by applying principal agent theory, it incorporates multiple risk control factors, including corporate risk bearing, effort levels and the reward and penalty mechanism to analyze the optimal choice decisions of leading firms and upstream suppliers under both individual and collective rationality. Moreover, in the context of supply chain disruption, the Co-competition Model of cluster-based supply chain restructuring across regions and across supply chains is further employed to analyze the behavioral strategies and triggering conditions under which leading firms in areas without industrial clusters choose enterprises in areas with industrial clusters to carry out cluster-based supply chain restructuring. The results indicate that (1) when leading firms implement effective incentive and constraint mechanisms for upstream suppliers participating in restructuring, supply chain production efficiency can be significantly enhanced, thereby achieving loss mitigation and mutual gains among enterprises. (2) the condition of supply chain restructuring hinges on the probability that counterparties choose cooperative strategies, business environment and the contract performance credit of firms in the clustered region. (3) supply chain restructuring not only improves the profit levels of involved firms, but also promotes the leap of the supply chain toward higher segments of the value chain, achieves Pareto improvement, strengthens risk resilience and enhances international competitiveness of the supply chain.