Tariff Policy between Revenue, Welfare, and Political Support: Evidence from the United States, 1997–2024

Tariff policy occupies a uniquely contentious role in modern economic policymaking. Historically, tariffs served as a primary source of government revenue, particularly before the institutionalization of income taxation. At the same time, they have long functioned as instruments of industrial protection, shielding domestic producers from foreign competition. The recent global resurgence of protectionist sentiment—particularly in developed economies—has reignited fundamental questions about the fiscal, economic, and political consequences of tariff interventions. This paper revisits these questions in the context of the United States between 1997 and 2024, a period marked by significant shifts in trade policy and macroeconomic volatility. Drawing on disaggregated tariff data, macroeconomic indicators, and public opinion polls, the study investigates three central questions: whether there exists a revenue-maximizing tariff rate, whether tariffs benefit or harm macroeconomic welfare, and how tariffs affect public support for government.